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Abstract: This paper examines the ways in which law, legal knowledge and power become in-
volved in social interaction. Any such interaction takes place within and is constrained and enabled 
by actual and imagined “power fields”, constituted by configurations of relations of autonomy and 
dependence. Legally constructed positions of legitimate power (in general rules or concrete decisions) 
can be important resources which can be drawn upon in interaction. This is illustrated with the 
experiences of Pak Dusa, a villager on the island of Ambon in Eastern Indonesia. The paper argues 
that the main difference between constructions of law in legal decisions made in courts and by other 
actors outside courts does not lie so much in the actors’ knowledge of the law but more in the courts’ 
legally constituted position to exercise power. However, as the experiences of Pak Dusa show, court 
decisions enter a wider power field in which they may loose their legally constructed significance, 
while his own, unauthorized law carried the day.
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1. Introduction 
This paper is an attempt to clarify my ideas and 
assumptions concerning the conceptual and em-
pirical relations between law and power. This is a 
very complex undertaking because both power and 
law are multivalent and contested concepts. Their 
meaning is often used in a rather common sense 
way. Moreover, when their relationship is discussed, 
authors easily get drawn into somewhat polarised 
approaches. One is a perspective that reproaches 
those devoting much attention to law for not giving 
sufficient attention to power. This is a kind of  “it’s 
power, stupid” perspective. This kind of critique is 
apt, where law is presented as the representation of 
a common will that is neutral to the political and 
economic interests of categories or groups of the 
population, and that is enforced neutrally through 
state institutions especially selected and trained for 
this task and given an independent position. In a 
way, this is a caricature of some western ideologies 
about law, which obviously does not fit the actual 
institutionalisation and functioning of legal systems. 
While it provides a handy straw man to critique a 
naive understanding of law and power, most social 
scientists but also many legal scholars do not hold 
such stereotype views and no longer have to be 
convinced that that “legal systems encode power 
asymmetries” and “that law is not neutral “ (Starr and 
Collier 1989, pp. 6-7; see also Turk 1978). The other 
perspective comes from the “but-law-is-also-impor-
tant” angle, which complains that in all discussions 
of power and celebrations of its importance, the dif-
ferent roles which law can have are downplayed, not 
even mentioned, or subsumed in general categories 
such as norms and values, or becomes dissolved in 
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the wider categories of the economic, political or 
cultural. In order to avoid any kind of reductionism, 
it is useful to see how the categories and the social 
phenomena they capture relate to each other. In my 
contribution, I shall first state some general points 
concerning my own thoughts on these issues. I shall 
then illustrate these ideas with a case study. It deals 
with the experiences of Pak (Father) Dusa, a villager 
in the village of Hila on the island of Ambon, with 
the law and judicial authorities which in my view 
nicely illustrates these points. At the end, I shall 
combine the analysis of Pak Dusa’s experiences with 
the law coming back to more general issues. 
2. Law and Power: Some General 
Observations
The Many Faces of Power2
What are the analytical properties of power? Power 
is often expressed as the ability to influence the 
behaviour or the behavioural alternatives of others. 
For Giddens (1979, p. 93) it is a “sub-category of 
transformative capacity, where transformative ca-
pacity is harnessed to actors’ attempts to get others 
comply with their wants”. Power thus understood 
is relational; it also is relative. For many authors 
following Weber (1956), power is a potential that 
can be mobilised. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) have 
elaborated “two faces” of power, basically power as 
structured in institutions and power instantiated in 
social interaction.
I do not think that we have to make a choice and 
would have to define power as either as potential 
inscribed into institutions or relationships, or only 
as actualised.3  We can use both and make clear what 
we mean, and which aspects or social expressions of 
power we talk about. We shall have to differentiate 
anyway. First of all, it is useful to distinguish between 
the domains and dimensions of social organisation in 
which power relations are located and play a role; not 
just in big politics and the functioning of the state 
apparatus but also in family relationships, relation-
ships within organisations or in property relations. 
Büscher and Dietz (in this volume) distinguish three 
types of power, decisional power, discursive power, 
regulatory power, which express three different sets of 
activities through which power is exercised. Foucault 
(1980) has emphasised that techniques of exercising 
power cannot simply be looked for in the unequal 
relations of rights and duties between state and 
citizens, but in the increasingly important realms of 
disciplinary power and techniques of power through 
the management of the population, “governmental-
ity” (see McClure 1997). Turk (1978) when writing 
about law as power and discussing the bases of power, 
distinguished five kinds of control over resources; 
in short: political, economic, ideological and diver-
sionary power and the control over direct physical 
violence. I think that all these different aspects of 
power are important and should not be reduced to 
one another.
Law
Since these different aspects of power point to quite 
different social phenomena, their relation to “law” 
will also be different. However, law is also a much 
discussed concept with probably even more faces 
than power. Lawyers, sociologists, political scientists 
and philosophers tend to think of law in terms of 
a rather ethnocentric legalistic understanding  in 
which law is fixed by definition to the state, the 
sovereign and some kind of underlying legitimatory 
fiction (social contract, will of the people, etc). In 
particular, comparative and historically orientated 
social scientists, anthropologists, tend to use a wider 
concept of law, which can be used for cross-societal 
comparison and analysis. Such analytical concepts 
on the one hand indicate the properties to be shared 
if social phenomena be called law, and, on the other, 
indicate the dimensions in which such phenomena 
vary. Calling different types of normativity law 
thus by no means effaces differences between legal 
orders; on the contrary, it helps to understand the 
historical and societal specificity of the empirical 
manifestations of the analytical category. One of 
the most discussed issues has been the question of 
whether or not law should be conceptually bound 
to the political organisation of the state. With many 
anthropologists of law I do not think this is useful for 
the purposes of comparative description and analysis 
to tie law to the state conceptually; on the contrary, 
I see it as a submission to the legal ideology of state 
governments and legal science.4 Law, in my use, is a 
summary category that comprises a variety of social 
phenomena, both within and between societies. Its 
empirical manifestations are not confined to consti-
tutive, pre- or proscriptive “rules” and principles; it 
can also be inscribed or become embodied in institu-
tions and social relationships, objects and persons. 
It can be involved in a variety of social interaction, 
and certainly not simply in the contexts of “legal” 
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decision making in courts or court-like institutions, 
as the experiences of Pak Dusa will show. 
Law and Power 
How should we relate analytic understandings of power 
to law, and of power and law to social life? My own 
preference is to adopt what K. von Benda-Beckmann 
and I have called a “layered approach” to social organi-
sation.5 That is that we assume that what power “is” 
as empirical phenomenon, will be found in different 
layers of social organisation. By layers we mean ana-
lytically different but interrelated categories of social 
phenomena that constitute social organisation: the 
legal-institutional layer; the actual social relationships; 
the layer of general ideological/cultural expressions; 
and the layer of social interaction. These are analytic 
distinctions; in the real world the difference may of-
ten be difficult to see; and social phenomena at these 
layers are interrelated through social practices. Just a 
very brief illustration in the field of marriage. The legal 
construction gives both marriage partners equal rights 
and demands consensus in many decisions. The actual 
relationships that have developed between the spouses, 
however, show that the wife is the dominant person, 
with much more transformative capacities (because he 
is a timid person, or because she has a strong character, 
or because she’s got all the money). The general ideol-
ogy (as well as the general pattern of domestic power 
relationships), of which both partners are quite aware, 
may be that the man is the boss in the house. Any 
interaction takes place in such contexts. The interac-
tions will certainly be influenced by the relationship 
of autonomy and dependence between the spouses. 
Their interactions may be influenced by ideology and 
legal rules. Any interaction also reproduces the relation-
ship between the spouses. This can be in line with the 
relationship pattern that has come into existence, it 
also may lead to a shift in the relationship and which 
the power differential changes. My main point here is 
to emphasise that what power and law are is different 
in these different categories of social phenomena, and 
their substance is usually different as well. There are 
different relations between different aspects of law and 
different aspects of power that should not be reduced 
to one another. 
Legal Institutionalisations of Power
At the legal-institutional level law defines in general, 
categorical terms, relations and positions of power of 
persons or organisations over persons, organisations 
and other resources in terms of rights and obligations. 
For many, and I would include myself, such legally 
constituted sets of power positions and relations 
are what is meant by “authority”; authority under-
stood as legally clothed power. Law also provides 
the legitimacy of this organisational distribution of 
power/authority. In other words, it provides one (of-
ten very important, sometimes the only) legitimation 
which says which exercise of power is permissible or 
impermissible, and what transactions or actions are 
valid or invalid.6 Because law organises and legiti-
mates power, the “legal certification of power”, as we 
could call it, is a resource much strived after in local, 
national and transnational arenas. In many societies, 
there are more than one set of legal construction 
and legitimation of power that define the different 
aspects of power positions and relations, often in a 
contradictory way; a situation usually referred to as 
“legal pluralism.7 These can have different sources and 
legitimations of the social agents making, maintain-
ing and sanctioning these rules, such as a democratic 
state, tradition, religious authority.
 
Power Ideologies
The legal institutional layer is different from the layer 
of general cultural understandings, philosophies, and 
ideologies about power. In most contemporary socie-
ties there is some ideological plurality. In one society, 
there may be several general standards for characteris-
ing and legitimating power, which co-exist and pos-
sibly compete with, and are different from, the legal 
ones; such as moral, ethical standards, or standards 
of naked power, usually based on the command and 
exercise of physical force. While ideological notions 
of power are usually inscribed into legal frameworks, 
law and ideology cannot be reduced to each other. Just 
think of a society with a rather strong gender ideol-
ogy favouring male power over female while gender 
equality and neutrality are legally institutionalised. 
But while ideological representations of power do 
not give an accurate picture of both legal/institutional 
frameworks and/or the actual distribution of power 
in a given organisation (that is, after all, why we call 
them ideology), they nevertheless can be an important 
source of motivation or justification in actual power 
practices.
Actual Power Relationships
While normatively constructed power grids may 
be important sources of power, we do not know to 
what extent they represent actual power relationships 
(legitimate or not), as these become  manifest in 
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asymmetries in relations of economic and political 
autonomy and dependence, the complexity of which 
can best be captured with the ideas of networks or 
configurations of social relationships. Power is always 
embedded in social relationships as a power differ-
ential. Since power is relational, any field of social 
relations is (amongst others) a power field.8 
 
Power in Interaction
 It is in the interaction in these power fields where 
it is made out whether or not the concrete interac-
tion (decision) and its transformative ambitions 
fade out into social irrelevance. The social effects of 
such attempts, the waves of interdependence they 
create, the degree to which they can change the 
power differentials in social, economic and political 
relationships, depends on the degree to which the 
other actors and institutions involved in such rela-
tionships can be brought to accept the consequences 
of such attempted exercises. Any attempt to exercise 
it is enabled and constrained by the set of relation-
ships in which it occurs. All interaction takes place 
in a context in which the positioning of actors in 
the wider power fields are important; a context that 
precedes the interaction (see Holy 1999). Actual 
power relations, legally institutionalised legitimate 
power positions, and ideological conceptions of how 
power is or should be distributed and exercised, 
are part of this context, and can all be deployed as 
resources in social interaction. This is conditioned 
by the historically grown and sedimented patterns 
of power relationships and differentials, but it is not 
determined by them. From an ex-ante perspective, 
power relations and wider power fields only indicate 
the potentialities and probabilities of how power 
relationships could influence social interaction. 
Legal-institutionalised power positions and power-
asymmetries are potentials that can be actualised 
in social practices of exercising power. Plural legal 
situations are giving a particularly wide set of pos-
sibilities, offering several repertoires of legitimate 
power relations and their political and economic 
relations of dependence. These can be mobilised 
against each other, but also can be combined. In this 
sense Turk (1978) has talked about law as a “weapon 
in social conflict”, and Vel (199) characterised the 
plurality of co-existing legitimations of powers as an 
“arsenal”. Through its instantiation in social practice, 
the relations of power are reproduced, maintained 
or changed and become the context for further in-
teractions (Giddens 1979, p. 93). “Power” thus is 
context, medium and outcome of social interaction 
in the sense of Giddens’ structuration theory. Power 
within social systems can be treated as involving the 
reproduced relations of autonomy and dependence 
in social interaction (Giddens 1979, p. 93).
Legal Knowledge and Power
Given the social value of the “legal certification of 
power” we must further ask how law becomes trans-
lated into power in social interaction, and to which 
extent knowledge of law is an important source of 
power. The saying that “knowledge is power” no-
where seems to be more true than in the field of law. 
Law lays down the conditions under which power 
can be exercised legitimately. Law is held to deter-
mine decision making processes which legitimate 
the transfer of goods and services, the allocation of 
social, economic and political resources, even the 
use of violence, against the wishes of the affected 
persons. Knowledge of such empowering rules and 
procedures therefore must be an important powerful 
resource itself. This has important social and political 
implications, for legal knowledge is unevenly distrib-
uted in most contemporary societies.9
The belief that legal knowledge is power is 
founded upon a rather simplistic model of law, 
the “law-as-rules-applied-to-facts” model. In this 
model, legal decisions result from the application 
of rules to facts. The law which fits the case under 
review is assumed to be pre-existent and known 
to the knowledgeable actor. Time and again, this 
simple model has been shown to be ideology, to 
misrepresent the way in which court decisions 
come about (see for instance Lautmann 197, 
Esser 197, Moore 1970). It is generally accepted 
now that making decisions is not just a subsump-
tion of fact under rule. “Facts” themselves are social 
constructions, representations of reality or “situation 
images” (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979). 10 Facts 
are constructed and made relevant for law largely 
through their reference to legal rules. The “facts“ of 
a “case” are “edited diagrams of reality the matching 
process itself produces” (Geertz 1983, p. 173). It is 
in this sense that it has been said, in the tradition of 
the rule and fact sceptics of American legal realism 
“that people cannot know the law unless the case 
has been decided upon by a court” (Phillips 198, p. 
57), or, more generally, that law cannot be “known” 
beyond specific instances of it (Wickham 1990, p. 
31). In this sense “law” means concretely interpreted 
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law, in which a concrete constructed situation image 
is evaluated for its legal consequences.11 Saying that 
law cannot be known except in its concretization by 
courts cannot, of course, be taken to mean that there 
could be no memory storage and recall of institu-
tionalized rules or previous decisions. It can only 
mean that, with respect to any concrete problem-
atic situation, the legal meaning and consequence 
of such situation can only be seen in the concrete 
interpretation of fact and consequence. Such regula-
tion can only be created through interpretation, the 
construction of “legal similes” of which it is asserted 
that they are derived from, and are in accordance 
with the general rules and principles. Before such 
instantiation of rules in a concrete situation there is 
only potential, hypothetical law. 
Given the generality and high degree of abstraction 
of “general law,” it cannot be different. The law 
which can be known consists of abstract generali-
ties full of uncertainties and ambiguities. Whatever 
efforts have been made to institutionalize and sys-
tematize such rule systems, they never are more than 
attempts at “regularization in a sea of indeterminacy” 
(Moore 1975). This is inherent in any legal system.1 
Legal systems only differ in the degree to which such 
indeterminacy is acknowledged or obscured in legal 
ideologies. Although different legal systems may 
have their own ideologies and modes of procedure, 
and their general rules and principles may be given 
different degrees of mandatoriness, recognizing more 
or less autonomy of the decision makers vis-à-vis 
the general rules — the actual procedures of “law 
application” largely come down to the same: A fact 
configuration and its legal relevance, and its evalu-
ation for consequences have to be rationalized and 
justified. Such rationalizations and justifications are 
always causal constructs.13 The behaviour and the ob-
jectives concerned must be represented as following 
logically from, or at least being in conformity with, 
the norms with which they are legitimated (F. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1989, p. 143). The “as-therefore” 
principle of rationalization and justification of con-
crete interpretations is a universal, whatever roads 
may have guided them, the subsumption logic of 
continental European law, an ideology of consensual 
decision making, or the way of Salomonic judge-
ments. The constraint to rationalize and justify there-
fore forces the social actors to represent the process 
of concrete interpretation and decision making on 
facts and consequences in a way which obscures the 
actual way decisions are taken. This is why the “rule-
applied-to-facts” model and its causal implications 
can be so successfully maintained although there is 
wide agreement about its ideological nature. 
With these assumptions in mind, let me turn to two 
major experiences of Pak (Father) in the village of 
Hila, on the island Ambon in the Moluccas in East-
ern Indonesia. These two experiences show how law, 
legal knowledge and power are combined in quite 
different and at first glance counterintuitive ways.
3. The Experiences of Pak Dusa
Pak Dusa, in his fifties, was a farmer most of the 
time, looking after his vegetable garden and clove 
trees. He often also had acted as a prokrol bambu, 
the Indonesian word for “bush lawyer.” His experi-
ences with the law had been enriched by the many 
disputes about property in which he had been per-
sonally involved. Such disputing had taken place 
within the village and outside. He had argued, 
claimed, won and lost in the village adat (customary 
law) sphere, in the state courts and in the Islamic 
religious courts. In comparison to other villagers, 
he was quite knowledgeable about adat rules and 
principles, he knew some Islamic law, and he also 
had a good insight in the procedural regulations 
and practices of state courts. He enjoyed displaying 
his knowledge and talking about his experiences. 
He was not mystified at all by the complex system 
of legal pluralism in which he lived, a normative 
world populated by government law, Islamic and 
traditional adat law. On the basis of his experiences, 
he had developed his own theory of the universals 
of legal competence. In his view, legal knowledge, in 
the sense of sophisticated knowledge of pre-existing 
rules, did not play a major role, although it might 
come in handy. What really counted were the fol-
lowing three factors:
1. You must have money (uang). The law and deci-
sion making institutions did not react by them-
selves. They had to be mobilized. Money was 
necessary in order to get any of the procedures 
going, whether you had a problem in the village 
or in a court, whether such money was required 
as official or as unofficial contribution to the 
machinery of justice. 
. You must be courageous (berani). In one’s dealings 
with law one was confronted with incumbents of 
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powerful positions. The more powerful people 
are, the greater the probability that they would 
disagree with you and your own interpretation 
of events and consequences. Also in direct con-
frontation with opponents you were likely to face 
more powerful persons. If you were afraid of such 
people, you could better forget about confronta-
tion.
3. You must have evidence (bukti). In order to argue 
one’s case, evidence of legally relevant fact was 
essential. One always had to base claims on facts, 
and one was always asked to prove them. It did 
not really matter so much in which legal system 
one operated. The fact knowledge embodied in 
evidence was usually relevant in all systems. Evi-
dence was no guarantee, but without it one stood 
no chance.
In his legal affairs, Pak Dusa lived up to his theory 
quite consistently. In particular, he was keen on 
acquiring evidence, written evidence in the form 
of documents (see F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 
1994b). But as everywhere, theory and practice also 
were different in the life of Pak Dusa. Let me describe 
some of his experiences with the law.
The Matter of the Disputed Clove Harvest
Pak Dusa had pledged some clove trees to a Butonese 
fellow villager, La Abutadi, for the period of three 
harvests. According to Ambonese local law (adat) 
such agreements entitle the pledgee to pick the cloves 
during “good” harvests. In bad harvests, the pledgee 
and pledgor should divide the harvest and the year 
does not “count” as a harvest in the agreement. In 
the year 1981, the interpretations of the quality of 
the harvest differed. Pak Dusa thought it to be a 
bad year in which the harvest should be divided, 
La Abutadi thought it to be a good one. To make 
sure that La Abutadi would not pick the cloves, Pak 
Dusa himself had harvested the trees.
La Abutadi did not accept this solution to their dis-
agreement and set about changing this unwelcome 
situation. He approached the village secretary, in 
order to have the village government settle the dis-
pute. The secretary (after having received 150,000 
rupiah for his good efforts from La Abutadi, as Pak 
Dusa alleged) in turn informed the village head. 
The village head informed the subdistrict head. 
Together they called a meeting with Pak Dusa and 
La Abutadi and stated that Pak Dusa should either 
give the harvested cloves to La Abutadi or return 
the pledging sum. When Pak Dusa refused, they 
prepared a “letter of declaration” with the following 
content: That Pak Dusa, with respect to his fault in 
carrying out the pledge agreement agreed/admitted 
that he would have to pay back the pledge sum of 
350,000 rupiah within a period of two months, 
with a monthly interest of 10% per month, thus 
altogether a sum of 630,000 rupiah. If he would 
not pay back the aforesaid sum within the specified 
time, he would forfeit his house in the village to La 
Abutadi, and Pak Dusa and his family would have 
to leave the house taking all their belongings with 
them. The document was signed by Pak Dusa, La 
Abutadi, the village head and the subdistrict head.
Reading the document one is inclined to believe 
Pak Dusa that he was strongly pressured into sign-
ing the agreement. He was confronted with the 
heads of the village and subdistrict administration, 
and he himself had little political support in the 
village. Although his clan was one of the important 
ones, which had provided the village with village 
heads, the present village head was from a different 
clan. Moreover, within his clan, Pak Dusa did not 
belong to the clan segment that had been politically 
prominent. He was also more of an individual op-
erator, not allied to one of the major factions in the 
village but rather offering his services across these 
boundaries. So in this position of weakness, he had 
signed, and since he had done so, things looked grim 
for him. But Pak Dusa did not accept defeat. Two 
days later, his wife wrote a letter to the village head, 
sending copies to the subdistrict head, La Abutadi 
and the subdistrict chief of the police. She wrote 
that the agreement signed by her husband was not 
in accordance with the principles of humanity and 
the valid law. It violated the law concerning the 
common property of husband, wife and children 
and involved a monthly interest of 10%, which had 
the character of extortion. Since the agreement had 
been made without her knowledge, she declared 
it to be invalid. This really was a clever move, Pak 
Dusa told us. For he himself surely could not have 
attempted to invalidate the agreement. Had he not 
signed it himself? And would he not have to accuse 
the village chief and the subdistrict head of using 
force, and could he ever be in a position to prove 
it? But fortunately he had thought of this last way, 
and had his wife write this letter. 
The letter seems to have had some effect. The village 
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secretary withdrew. But the village head and the 
subdistrict head were not impressed by this letter 
and renewed their pressure on Pak Dusa. So five 
weeks later, Pak Dusa’s wife wrote another letter to 
the village head, in which she repeated her points 
more elaborately, emphasising that the agreement 
had not been signed voluntarily and that it was con-
trary to the valid law which in this case was known 
as onderhandse akte. For such matters one should 
consult the valid regulations (ordonantie); that there 
was an unacceptable accounting error in the agree-
ment; that with an interest of as high as 10% one 
already was a usurer, which clearly was in violation 
of a presidential instruction. One thus would have 
to conclude that the village head supported a usurer 
acting in violation of presidential instructions; that 
besides all this such a civil agreement had no basis at 
all in the positive law: for why had she, as Pak Dusa’s 
wife, not been asked to cooperate while the property 
mentioned in the agreement was also hers; that the 
matter concerned a civil subject matter which could 
not be settled by the village head by way of making 
a letter of agreement (surat pernyataaan). So far her 
letter, which she signed with her thumbprint for she 
was illiterate! Copies of the letter were sent to the 
subdistrict head, the subdistrict chief of police, the 
chief of police of the district, the chief of police of 
the province, the governor of the province, and the 
head of the provincial security department. All these 
agencies were “approached in the hope that they 
would give their full attention to the prevention of 
usurious practices against the small people.”
After this letter, Pak Dusa heard no more from 
the village head. After some time, La Abutadi ap-
proached him again and they made peace. The 
Butonese picked the trees during the next good 
season “according to their original agreement.” Pak 
Dusa kept the harvest of the disputed season, and 
the village secretary the 150,000 rupiah which he 
had received from La Abutadi.
The Land and Houses Dispute
This time, Pak Dusa had been able to extract himself 
out of quite a difficult situation. But his experiences 
with the law had not always been so successful. In 
a series of property disputes with a distant kinsman 
of the same clan, Pak Dusa and this kinsman had 
pursued three disputes up to the Supreme Court of 
Indonesia, well over 000 kms away to the West. 
This concerned “old” disputes between the clan 
segments of Pak Dusa and his adversary, whose 
segment in colonial times had been more promi-
nent in providing the village with village heads and 
other officials. The more or less same issues of land 
ownership and inheritance had been disputed in 
the generations of their grandfathers and fathers 
but never been really resolved (see F. and K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1994b). One of these disputes 
concerned the ownership of a tract of clan land. For 
some 10 years, several houses had been built by other 
villagers on this land, with the consent of Pak Dusa’s 
adversary who lived in the clan-house close to the 
disputed land. After a lengthy period of litigation, 
in the village and later in the state courts, Pak Dusa 
had finally won his case in the Supreme Court of 
Indonesia. His adversary, not content with the state 
of affairs, had taken new initiatives and started a new 
case in the state court of the city of Ambon. He lost, 
for the state court accepted the final judgement of 
the Supreme Court. Since his adversary still refused 
to accept the final judgement, Pak Dusa obtained an 
order of execution by the state court, and on a given 
day three court officials and 18 policemen came to 
Hila to execute the judgement; that is, to declare 
publicly that the land in question was Pak Dusa’s, 
that the houses on the land had been built without 
a legally valid consent, and that the people living 
there either had to vacate the land or come to new 
agreements with the rightful owner, Pak Dusa.
So everything seemed to have turned out well for Pak 
Dusa. However, when the party went to the land in 
question, all of a sudden Pak Dusa was stabbed in his 
stomach by a close relative of his adversary. Pak Dusa 
was seriously beaten up and, on top of that, by the 
people who would have had to evacuate their houses 
had the judgement been carried out. Pak Dusa barely 
survived, spent three weeks in hospital. Three of his 
adversary’s followers were prosecuted by the police 
and were held to be obliged to pay for Pak Dusa’s 
medical costs. However, with respect to the land 
and the houses nothing changed. Eight years later, 
in 1986, Pak Dusa was still saving money in order to 
obtain a new execution order. His adversary told us 
smilingly that any new effort to execute the judge-
ment would meet with a similar result. He regretted 
that the Supreme Court did not yet understand fully 
the adat law relevant in this matter, but he hoped to 
put things right and to clarify what obviously were 
misunderstandings.
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4. Law, Legal Knowledge and Intelligence 
Let us take a closer look at these cases. In the first 
case, Pak Dusa had made his own law, and he made 
it stick. He constructed situation images of usury, 
of patronage of usurers, of a decision outside the 
competence of the decision makers. The original 
problematic situation — was it a good or a bad 
harvest, and what were the consequences of that?; 
was successively transformed into one of the validity 
of the agreement, and into one of possibly unlaw-
ful, criminal behaviour of the village head and the 
subdistrict head. He created these facts, evaluated 
them in terms of validity and permissibility, and spelt 
out the consequences, using state law as his frame 
of reference. He did not go into great detail, for he 
would not have known many details. What his legal 
constructions required was a highly creative spirit, 
legal intelligence, to construct legal similes which 
“could” be true in terms of the general legal rules and 
principles, even if one did not know these legal rules 
and principles in any detail.14 Pak Dusa’s educated 
guesses were largely bluff. Neither he nor the village 
and subdistrict head knew whether there were really 
any presidential instructions saying that 10% inter-
est per month would amount to usury; according 
to local level practice such percentage is regarded 
as normal. Pak Dusa’s references to “the valid law,” 
the ordonantie, the positive law, definitely would 
have not carried the day in terms of lawyers’ legal 
knowledge, for a settlement of the dispute by way of 
agreement would have been quite acceptable accord-
ing to whatever legal system. In order to invalidate 
it, Pak Dusa would have had to prove that he really 
was forced to sign the agreement against his will. The 
claim that the house was common property which 
could not simply be signed away by one spouse was 
itself a strong one in terms of adat or the state law 
but no specifically expert knowledge is required to 
come up with this notion. Inheritance to land and 
trees on Ambon is mainly bilateral, and women often 
receive as much or more than male children. Islamic 
inheritance rules and courts are only very rarely mo-
bilised. Property acquired by spouses during their 
marriage is the dominant legal principle (see F. von 
Benda-Beckmann and Taale 1996). 
Pak Dusa’s constructions of facts and consequences, 
though based on bluff, were so plausible and threat-
ening that they could supersede the situation image 
which had given rise to the whole process, the one 
of a problematic clove harvesting contract. The 
threatening aspect, for the village and the subdistrict 
heads, was created by inserting his constructions into 
government law and its guardians; not so much by 
appealing to the courts but to the police and the 
military. No reference, for instance, was made to 
Islamic law, which prohibits the taking of interest; 
even though all persons involved were Islamic except 
for the subdistrict head. While this would have pro-
vided a good substantive argument, such reference 
would have been naive, for it would have distracted 
from the political power field in which he wanted 
to situate his “reality:” the state system, the system 
of the military and the police, the president himself. 
The validity of Islamic law in such matters could be 
disputed by the village chief and the subdistrict head; 
to dispute the validity of the president as law giver 
would have been a much more risky undertaking. 
How different was the situation in the other case. 
The combined expert legal knowledge and authority 
embodied in the Supreme Court judgment, which 
he had so successfully mobilized in accordance with 
his theory, could not help Pak Dusa. 
5. Actual and Imagined Power Fields 
What can we learn from a comparison of these two 
case histories? What was the difference between Pak 
Dusa’s law and the law of the courts? And how to 
explain their different effects in transforming politi-
cal and economic relationships in the village?
It is instructive to look at the different power fields 
in which these processes occur.  The social effect of 
processes, the waves of interdependence they cre-
ate depend on the degree to which the other actors 
and institutions involved in such relationships can 
be brought to accept the consequences of such at-
tempted exercises. This not only conditioned by the 
historically grown power relationships and differen-
tials, as they exist in the village of Hila, or in the state 
judiciary. It also depends on the “images of relevance” 
constructed by the actors in the power field. Such 
ex ante constructions, like that of “legal relevance”, 
are also hypothetical, and their social force will lie 
in the plausibility which this hypothezised image of 
relevance has for the actors in this field. In analogy 
to Anderson (1991) we could think of “imagined 
power fields”. Law, is not simply, as Geertz (1983) 
told us, a way to “imagine the real”; is also and much 
more often a way of imagining the possible or the 
probable. It was the skillful manipulation of these 
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probabilities, rather than the actual distribution of 
power, which was decisive in the first case. It was 
here where Pak Dusa’s strength lay; to conjure up the 
probability that the powerful agents receiving a copy 
of his wife’s letter might indeed get into motion and 
would use their power potential, their transformative 
ability/capacity, to act in ways predicted by Pak Dusa. 
He transformed the legally relevant situation image, 
and made it seem relevant in terms of other power 
relations, by actually or by bluff involving higher 
level political authorities. If we look at the first case: 
It played in the village power field, into which La 
Abutadi had brought in the highest village authority 
and the even higher authority of the subdistrict head. 
In the village power field, the problem was an isolate 
between Pak Dusa and the stranger, La Abutadi, who, 
as a Butonese immigrant, had no basis in the political 
structure of Hila. The rest of the villagers were not 
involved, they were “lookers-on” as it were. What Pak 
Dusa achieved was to transform the problem into 
one which could be relevant in the village external 
power field of the political-administrative system. 
Obviously, he bluffed, but it was a plausible bluff. 
The village head and the subdistrict head did not dare 
to call the bluff. Pak Dusa had been too clever for 
them, they were not able to extricate themselves out 
of the new problematic reality which Pak Dusa had 
constructed, and to return to the “original case.”
  
6. Judges’ Law and Pak Dusa’s Law
In the other case, Pak Dusa had mobilized the high-
est legal authority in Indonesia. Yet all the authority 
and present power of 18 policemen could not help 
Pak Dusa to have a judgment of the highest judi-
cial authority executed. How can we explain the 
differences between Pak Dusa’s law and the law of 
the court? In the way in which concrete law is con-
structed, there is no difference between the concrete 
law constructed by courts or by laymen — neither 
can know the concrete law in advance. Neither can 
a difference be found pointing at a greater social 
significance of the court judgement, on the contrary. 
What distinguishes their concrete interpretations of 
law, and what makes the interpretation of the judge 
into “spoken law” and that of the other an “educated 
guess,” is not primarily their knowledge of abstract 
rules, principles or precedents. The difference comes 
about as a result of two legally constructed, norma-
tive elements:
1. Judges’ interpretations and decisions are “legal” 
because they are given in a specific legally in-
stitutionalized context in which, to paraphrase 
Wickham, interpretations are given value in “legal 
currency” (1990, p. 34).15 Within this context, 
decisions become law. This is the case even where 
decisions are not based on good rule knowledge; 
something which often occurs if judges interpret 
and apply legal rules (like local African or Asian 
rules) with which they are unfamiliar (see F. and 
K. von Benda-Beckmann 1988). Outside this 
context, on the other hand, a judge interpreting 
and evaluating a case with sound legal knowledge, 
would not speak “law.”
. Judges’ interpretations differ from educated 
guesses in that they are “final.” Guessing has 
found an end in the authoritative declaration in 
the legal context. True, there still are mechanisms 
for invalidating such statements, and establish-
ing their nature as temporary guesses, by way of 
appeals. But such procedures give only a limited 
extension, within a restricted institutional and 
time frame. Once the highest legal authority has 
spoken, the statement is final within the system. 
Such finality, we must note, is also constructed 
through law; the concrete law of the court is final 
in legal currency only. 
This perspective has consequences for the relation 
between legal knowledge and power, because the 
significance of legal knowledge is implicated in the 
ideological representation of decision making. While 
legal doctrines and ideologies want us to believe 
that decisions are primarily determined by legal 
knowledge, and not by social or political power, we 
see that it is essentially social and political power 
which underlies courts’ decision making. The power 
attributed to (general) legal knowledge of legal ex-
perts, judges in particular, in truth may lie in their 
power to make legal decisions, a power conveyed on 
them by their appointment to a legally legitimated 
position of power.16
 The courts’ decision making power was successfully 
mobilised by Pak Dusa. But the courts’ authority to 
construct the relevant concrete law in their decisions 
as such is not sufficient for transforming what has 
been decided into actual practice. Decision making 
power, and the power to carry out such decisions, 
are two different issues, and the actual interactions 
of decision making and executing them are situated 
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in different power fields, or in different segments 
of larger power fields. The law the courts speak, 
the decisions they take, flow back into “society,” 
into the power fields which permeate it. The “legal 
currency” used in the legalized production of law, 
may not be valid outside the court context. Judges’ 
decisions may never leave this context, or it may be 
outside this context be reinterpreted, transformed, 
exchanged into different “currencies” (Moore 1973, 
Galanter 1981, K. von Benda-Beckmann 1985). The 
institutionalized meaning which made the utterances 
of a judge into law there may lose its meaning and 
significance.
If we look at the power fields of the court system 
and the one into which the decision of the court 
flowed back, we see the following: In the world of 
the courts, Pak Dusa’s case was an isolated one, one 
of a myriad of cases, to which no more attention was 
given than to others. It returned to the village power 
field, but there it ceased to be isolated. It was not his 
adversary alone whom Pak Dusa was facing, but the 
owners of the houses built on the land under dispute, 
who had an interest in retaining the old situation 
because they would have had to pay new sums to him 
with no chance of recovering old payments to his 
adversary. These people belonged to different clans, 
and could count on support by their clansmen. The 
expansion of the conflict was therefore programmed 
almost automatically.17 Under these circumstances, 
Pak Dusa did not have a chance. He probably 
could have won from his opponent, and he would, 
I think, have got his “right” accepted in the village, 
had he not implicated the house owners. This was 
considered “too much” From the point of view of 
the police and the court officials, an isolated court 
judgement was transformed into the probability of 
a village war. That became too much for them, and 
they withdrew. Was perhaps Pak Dusa’s theory not 
so pragmatic after all, and did he, despite his cynical 
assessment of the legal world, invest too much trust 
into the legal-political system?18 Time will tell, this 
is what I wrote in 1991. And time told. When we 
came back to Ambon the next time in 1994, Pak 
Dusa had died. His wife did not want to engage in 
these troubles again, and their children were away 
on Java. But you never know. In a couple of years, 
children or grandchildren of Pak Dusa may find the 
judgments of the Supreme Court and get into the 
disputing business again. 
Notes
1 This is a revised version of the lecture given at the PhD 
Workshop on “Power, Development and Environment”, 
held in Nexoe, Bornholm, June -4 004. The empirical 
material referred to is based on field research on Ambon, 
where my wife and I did research in the mid-1980s. The 
case of Pak Dusa was originally published in  F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1991.
 The image of face goes back to Bachrach and Baratz 
(1970).
3 For elaborations of the concept, see among others Weber 
1956; Moore 1970; Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Foucault 
1980; Lukes 1974; Giddens 1979. See also S. Lund and 
Nuijten in this volume.
4 For a recent overview of the discussions on “law” and “legal 
pluralism” see F. von Benda-Beckmann 00.
5 We have elaborated this approach in some detail for property 
relations and social security (1994a; 1999).
6 Note that this legal legitimation also extends to Foucault’s 
realms of disciplinary power and governmentality, even if 
the exercise of power via these techniques are less predefined 
by law. 
7 For overviews on the history and meaning of this contested 
concept see Griffiths 1986; Merry 1988; F. von Benda-
Beckmann 00.
8 I employ the field-metaphor here because it points at sets 
of social relationships and interactions that are not closely 
bounded. For my use it does not really make a difference 
whether field is understood here as semi-autonomous social 
field in Moore’s (1973) sense or Nuijten’s (003) notion of 
“force field”, and in this volume.
9 Law is a field of knowledge that is differentiated from the 
layman‘s common knowledge. A specialized university 
training has to be followed. For those wanting to engage 
in professions in which the use of legal knowledge fills up 
most of their work, like judges, advocates or legal scientists, 
period of further practical training is often obligatory before 
they are considered sufficiently knowledgeable to interpret, 
practice, or speak the law.
10 For the notion of situation images, see F. von Benda-Beck-
mann 1979: 8-9, 1986.
11 I have called this “concrete law,” and distinguished such 
concrete law from “general law,” meaning abstract defini-
tions of general situation images, standards of evaluation 
and consequential rules (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979, 
1986). 
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1 African folk systems in that respect do not differ very much 
from European rule systems (see already Gluckman in his 
judicial process among the Barotse, 1955; see further Moore 
1978, also F. von Benda-Beckmann 1986).
13 This causality introduced into rationalisation and justifica-
tion is, of course, different from the type of ex-post causality 
between events constructed in sociological explanations (see 
Mclver1969, pp. 96—97).
14 To speak with Ryle, “knowing how” knowledge, the tactical 
knowledge of how to operate in terms of rules, is much more 
important than “knowing that” knowledge, the knowledge 
of the general rules and principles of the law (Ryle 1970, 
p. 8).
15 This is not particular to European legal doctrines. Also 
in less differentiated and scientificized normative systems 
knowledge may be firmly tied to status, be this the Pope or 
a clan chief and adat expert.
16 This point has been brought out clearly in Moore’s critical 
discussion of the typologies and continua of dispute settle-
ment processes constructed by Gulliver (Moore 1970). As 
Moore points out, the creation of one-dimensional polar 
opposites between “legal” decisions determined by law and 
“political“ decisions determined by the relative power of 
the disputing parties hide the power of decision making 
agencies that rationalise and justify their decisions as being 
determined by rules, and it also hides the significance which 
reference to legally defined rights and obligations can play 
as a resource in negotiating processes.
17 On the expansion of disputes in Ambonese villages, see F. 
and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994c.
18 It is interesting to look at Pak Dusa’s future strategy. The 
next time, he promised, he would be more clever. He 
would involve the external power system, the courts and 
the police, more directly in order to make the execution 
of the judgment more important for them. He would not 
choose the other way, of isolating the problem in the village 
as one between himself and his adversary only, although he 
could have done so by lessening the consequences for the 
people who had built houses on the land, and thus cutting 
through their relationships with his adversary.
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